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IThe European idea, or, in other words, the movement 
to outlaw in Western Europe the old scourges of envy, 
hatred and war and to try to prepare for the future 
together, constitutes without any doubt the greatest 
political doctrine of this century. It inaugurated a 
total new chapter of European history. Other conti- 
nents looked up at what was happening here, in our 
area. It encompassed economic as well as political 
components and has already produced more prosper- 
ity than could have been achieved by the obsolete 
formulae. It was found to be the secret of the best 
peace policy ever designed in Europe. It paved the 
way to a fertile future full of great expectations: even 
if the still incomplete structure has to be completed.
It is my wish to examine today with you the question 
- if we have remained faithful to the spirit and the will 
which were characteristic for the pioneers of this 
thought, and which obstacles still have to be over- 
come before we can complete the unification.
II
In point of fact the pioneers of the European ideal 
f ostered, folio wing the Second W orld W ar, three great 
expectations. The first one consisted of bringing at last 
conciliation between Germany and France. For many 
years these countries had considered each other as 
hereditary enemies. By doing so differences and con- 
flicts were so exaggerated that they lead regularly to 
bloody wars. Now, Europe was reduced to ruins. The
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Occident, the part of the European continent that was 
considered as the most civilised part of the world, as 
the center of science and culture, was totally ex- 
hausted by military struggles, for the most part devas- 
tated and not capable of starting a reconstruction by 
its own means.
What was called in that period "the reconciliation" 
has indeed been a success. Nobody would think today 
that a new war could break out between the two 
countries. The "reconciliation" of the postwar period, 
has been developed into the principle of solidarity. 
All the member states of the European Community 
have their part in it. But many are wondering if that 
solidarity will hold out and if it will remain at the 
level the founding fathers wanted to achieve.
That they did not limit their ambitions to economic 
proposals. That already with the Coal and Steel 
Authority political objects were also pursued was 
underlined by Chancellor K. Adenauer in the speech 
delivered on June 13,1950 in the Bundestag when he 
said: "I wish to declare explicitely and not only with 
complete approval of the French Government but also 
of Jean Monnet, that this project is in the first place of 
great political significance and not only economic".
Very characteristic for this period was the letter which 
Jean Monnet sent to Harold MacMillan in July 1950, 
as an answer to the counter-proposals launched in 
Strasburg by the prospective prime minister: "The 
proposals in the Schuman-plan are revolutionary or 
they don't mean anything. Their fundamental princi-
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pal exists in the delegation of sovereignity in limited 
but decisive domains. In my eyes, a plan which does 
not start from that principle cannot constitute a useful 
contribution to the solution of the big problems we 
have to deal with. Whatever the importance of 
cooperation between nations, it does not solve any- 
thing. What we must seek is a fusion of the interests 
of the European peoples and not only the main- 
tenance of the balance of these interest".1
On the 3rd of July of the same year, when the new 
treaty was being negotiated, Jean Monnet distributed 
a text to the press in which the following was said: 
"The withdrawal of a state from the Community, to 
which it was pledged, should not be allowed, unless 
with the agreement of all other states, both for the 
withdrawal and for the conditions under which it 
could happen.
This rule summarizes how fundamental the transfor- 
mation is which the French proposal aims to achieve. 
Through and via coal and steel, it paves the way for 
a European federation. In a federation no one can 
unilaterally decide to secede. Equally, there can only 
be a Community between peoples if they commit 
themselves without time limits and without looking 
for a way to return to former positions”.
The fact that in December 1991, in the now well know 
city of Maastricht, all the member states present did
1 Monnet Mémoires, éd. Fayard, Paris, 1976, p. 374 and p. 
382.
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not accept the same obligations is clear evidence that 
not all capitals hold the same views. What will be the 
future consequences of the opt-outs conceded to 
Great Brittain and the fact that Denmark was allowed 
to drop essential parts of the new decisions? How will 
such a union function and how will it be perceived by 
the outside world? How will it be presented as a 
united entity, containing as it does such serious differ- 
ences? And what tendencies will thus be encouraged 
in new candidates for membership of the Commu- 
nity?
Jacques Delors declared in February of this year that 
it was not unthinkable to see in the enlargement of 
the Community a serious risk of the end of it. Does 
such an opinion not signify that, for a man like the 
President of the Commission, important differences 
in the commitments of the member states could be- 
come a danger for the survival of the Union?
The principle of subsidiarity has made its unexpected 
entry in the jargon of the European Community. The 
Commission, the Council and the European Parlia- 
ment have drawn up documents trying to define their 
positions for an application of the principle. But those 
who were acquainted with it - as you know Thomas 
of Aquinus wrote about it and one can find it back in 
some social encyclica - know that in the Christian 
social doctrine subsidiarity and solidarity are always 
linked together. Experts on federal constitutions have 
always adopted the theses that subsidiarity is in fact 
the working-method within a federal structure. 
Solidarity is achieved within the whole structure.
6
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Subsidiarity is used to divide competences between 
the federal authority and the member states.
It is clear for insiders that solidarity in such a frame- 
work means also the attachment to or the respect for 
the whole. It could be compared to what is called in 
Germany with its federal system "Bundestreue". But 
such a conception of the total structure is absent in 
the,European Community and in the planned Union. 
That's the reason that the relationship between sub­
sidiarity and solidarity cannot be drawn in an un- 
equivocal way. The situation is ambiguous. The 
greatest opponents of European integration invoke 
on each occasion the principle of subsidiarity. On the 
other hand the greatest supporters of that integration 
are all the time paying tribute to that same principle. 
Both cannot be right.
I should add that application of subsidiarity supposes 
the possibility of formulating a qualitative judgment. 
But such an act is always difficult if not impossible in 
politics. The principle does not offer jurists anchor- 
age. How, in these circumstances, can it be very 
useful? It was impossible in Maastricht to reach a 
common view on the final structure of the Union. 
What was included in the texts has no political or legal 
significance ("an ever closer union").
Does not this mean that Europe still beats against the 
wind, without a compass? In other words, that it does 
not yet know where the home port lies?
7
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III
The second objective consisted in the resolution not 
to repeat the economic heresies which were so typical 
for the thirties. You will remember that a stock ex- 
change crisis broke out in the USA in the fall of 1929; 
it was quickly transformed into a recession and short- 
ly afterwards into an economic crisis. Millions of 
unemployed persons were seeking jobs in extremely 
difficult circumstances. This crisis soon afterwards 
spread to Europe. The systems of social security were 
then not as developed as they are nowadays.
All the countries that were the victims of that cata- 
strophe thought that they could solve the problem by 
recurring to purely national measures in the combat 
against unemployment and the recession in the busi­
ness cycle. But as they closed their borders for pro- 
ducts coming from abroad and manipulated their 
currencies, hoping to obtain a temporary advantage 
by doing so, their competitors did the same and thus 
the crisis was hurried on its way all over the world.
The proposals coming from countries trying, not- 
withstanding the difficulties, to promote more inter­
national cooperation were ignored. The Convention 
concluded by the Oslo-states e.g. was a victim of that 
international shortsightedness.
The end of this sad evolution was the outbreak of 
World War II in 1939.
Now, at this moment Europe is again struck by a 
serious economic recession. In Spain 19 % of the active
8
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population is jobless, in France 12 % and the figure is 
going up, in Great Brittain the figure of 3 million has 
been reached and comparisons are made with the 
prewar situation. I need go no fürther quoting figures 
like these.
What is striking in this disturbing situation is the 
hesitation of the Community (I recognize that the 
Cómmission just announced a plan of action) to set 
up an impressive programme not only because it is 
necessary but also to prove that, combined with 
national policies where it is possible, a conclusive 
answer to a critical situation can be given by the 
Europeans. In February of this year a so called inves- 
titure debate took place in the European Parliament 
in Strasburg. On this occasion it looked as if Jacques 
Delors wanted to give vent to his discouragement. 
Yet, the first information about new proposals com­
ing from the Commission could already be read in the 
newspapers. But the complete, concrete content was 
not yet know. On behalf of the Group I belong to it 
was my duty to infuse new life into his thinking and 
hopefully change his attitude. The fact that the Com­
mission had accepted such an investiture debate was 
a token of courage and proved that its idea of the 
relationship between Parliament and Commission is 
exemplary and speaks well of its full respect for the 
parliamentary institution.
I did teil Parliament that we refused to consider the 
new Commission as a transitional one. It has, as is 
generally known, only been appointed for a period of 
two years. On the contrary we expect from it coura-
9
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geous initiatives. We refuse to become the victims of 
the economic decline. The time had come to draw up 
an ambitious programme and to overcome, together 
with the member states, the menacing crisis.
What do we observe, here and there, in the political 
world, and also in some enterprises? They want in 
fact to do away with European proposals and actions. 
They do not have the courage to declare this in such 
a brutal way and their negative attitude is not yet 
formulated in a clear language. But they shout: 
"Europe, Europe? We are also in favour of Europe, 
but not for the existing one". To which one they want 
to devout themselves they don't say, because they are 
the partisans of a purely national policy; they want to 
put an end to the existing European construction. 
Consequently, they reject the texts approved in Maa­
stricht. They stand for a policy as it was practiced in 
the thirties, without any success. If they acept a 
Europan initiative, it is only in the form of a coopera- 
tion for which unanimity is required. In any case they 
want to have the right to veto. It could be that their 
knowledge of economic history is rather weak. But 
their programmes correspond to the attitudes formed 
in earlier, unsuccessful, times.
Even in the U.S.A. you can find nowadays a com- 
parable mentality. The Clinton campaign was mainly 
based on propaganda accepting practically only the 
American interest. It has been said openly that Europe 
no longer constituded a priority. At the last legislative 
elections 110 new members were sent to the US House 
of Representatives. They were asked on which parlia-
10
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mentary committee they wanted to sit. Only one of 
the newcomers chose the Foreign Affairs Committee!
What happened in Denmark with the referendum 
came through as the slogan: "Denmark first". Also in 
France strange voices could be heard trying to flatter 
French national feelings and to argue against the 
European Community. The confusion which has been 
créated in the United Kingdom is well known. The 
British Government was forced in September 1992 to 
devalue the pound sterling and to leave the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism. In my opinion, this was 
only a temporary measure because technically speak- 
ing only a quick return in order to strenghten that 
mechanism could contribute to the creation of a 
monetary union and prevent harmful international 
speculation against a European currency. Taken sep- 
arately, no one currency can hold out against these 
waves of speculation.
Notwithstanding this evidence the British Prime Min­
ister, John Major, declared on New Year's day that his 
government did not envisage a return to the E.R.M. 
before 1994. Some observers are still more sceptical 
and don't even expect a return in that year. The other 
day the same Prime Minister declared the position of 
the pound sterling an advantage, encouraging British 
exports and attracting foreign enterprises thanks to 
low salaries and social costs. This caused much com- 
motion on the continent, especially in the trade un- 
ions. The notion of social dumping made its entry in 
the jargon of the Community.
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The general impression is that Chancellor Kohl was 
courageous in Maastricht, but, alas, he was also in- 
dulgent. He declared recently, during a trip to India, 
that he would exercise patience till June. If at that 
moment the approval of Maastricht is not settled, he 
would advocate a Europe of eleven, or if such should 
be the case, of ten member states. Even, he added, if 
certain legal problems still had to be resolved.
This does not mean that there are no difficulties in his 
own country. Also in Germany voices are heard 
against European unification. New forces try to dis- 
suade public opinion from the views that there is a 
necessity to concentrate on European solutions. They 
are pleading in favour of German ones; especially on 
Monetary Union. The decisions taken in Maastricht 
concerning a European currency are under attack. 
Complete resolution not to repeat prewar economic 
heresies is now more urgent than ever.
But who will take over the role of the European 
pioneers?
If Europe should fail on this particularly sensitive 
point, not much will be left of a European vision of 
the fundamental problems or of the decision to create 
a European Union.
IV
The third motive of the Founding Fathers was that 
Europe must unify to have some weight in world 
politics.
12
EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN 1951 AND IN 1993
Out of the Second World War emerged two super- 
powers compared to which all the other European 
countries were small or medium sized. Now we have 
assisted at the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist reg­
imes in Eastern and Central Europe. The reunification 
of the two Germany's has taken place without armed 
conflict or bloodshed. Nobody had ever believed this 
possible during this century. But all these develop- 
ments have consequences for the European Commu- 
nity and relative power within the Community.
The decision taken in Maastricht, to create a common 
foreign and security policy must be considered as an 
especially courageous and significant political act. I 
regret very much that not all the member states have 
endorsed and applauded this brave act. But there is 
also another way of looking at the situation. If we do 
not achieve such a common foreign and security 
policy how long will it be before small separate 
"other" agreements, alliances or ententes are born 
among the member states? Did we not observe at the 
conferences and negotiations about ex-Yugoslavia 
how the old demons were almost visibly present?
Do international analysts not indicate with great certi- 
tude who in fact sympathizes with Croatians, Slo veni- 
ans, Serbs or Moslims? Do we not hear, every day, the 
question: "what does the United Kingdom support, 
what does Germany favour, what is the attitude of 
France, of Greece, of Turkey? Do we not refer, much 
too often, to what has been arranged in Versailles, St. 
Germain, Trianon or Sèvres?
13
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The UN Security Council made a first military deci- 
sion to protect the no-fly zone in Bosnia; after the 
humanitarian action made possible thanks to the 
activities of the Blue Helmets of the United Nations 
this was a decision with possible military conse- 
quences.
It was a long time before it was decided to act against 
a certain way of waging war. In as far as the U.N. 
decision can contribute to stopping agression or war 
like deeds, it was hailed by many.
But is it not humiliating for the European Community 
that neither the Western European Union nor the 
Twelve could adopt a common policy? Is it not a 
shame that an appeal had to be made to NATO, the 
defense organisation of the West during the Cold 
War, to execute the plans of the Security Council? In 
ex-Yugoslavia it is a tragic, murderous, horrible civil 
war that is going on, characterized by unheard of 
cruelties, - and this on European territory. NATO was 
never designed to handle such situations. But Europe, 
organized Europe, is unable and obviously politically 
unemancipated to create some semblance of order.
This brings us to the obsessive question: how long 
will it be, without a common foreign and security 
policy such as it was announced in Maastricht - but 
hopefully after 1996 without the necessity to decide 
unanimously - before, under the pressure of new links 
of friendship or interests, we will return to the di- 
plomacy of the thirties? As if, in the meantime, we 
learned nothing.
14
VBut if we make the structure of a new Europe, based 
on the existing treaties, plus thé amendments from 
Maastricht - and we improve and complete them at 
the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996 - Europe 
could enter into a totally new chapter of its history. 
In that case this continent will no longer be charac- 
terized by a malicious struggle for power and a 
striving for political, economical or territorial expan- 
sion. The member states will obey the same European 
laws. The rules of the European Union must deter- 
mine and regulate relations between them. On essen- 
tial questions they will accept the same common lines 
of conduct.
With the realization of that concept - some call it the 
ambitious, audacious and after all, realistic dream - a 
united, peaceful, prosperous Europe, will be 
achieved. It can change history.
The new challenges that without any doubt will 
confront us will at lastbe tackled in common: ecology, 
technology, science, immigration, agriculture, third 
world, unemployment, development, etc. In this way 
this part of Europe can contribute substantially to the 
improvement of the global society. In a sense, it can 
even be an example for other regions in the world. In 
any case these conditons of unity and cooperation are 
indispensable if we want to conclude important ac- 
cords with the U.S.A. and Japan. In this way by 
putting a floor under world economy and improving 
understanding a great stability could be reached in 
World Politics.
EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN 1951 AND IN 1993
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But what can be expected if we prove to be incapable 
of completing this structure? Already nowadays we 
can hear voices formulating possibilities in case of the 
failure of Maastricht. It is said, it could happen in the 
monetary field, that some member states would be 
forced to seek closer relations to defend themselves 
against a certain kind of international speculation. 
This means that a mini-union would be founded 
without waiting for of all twelve member states. In 
this respect many observers followed the French-Ger- 
man contacts of last week with very special attention.
Of course the first measure to be taken, if the Twelve 
desire to stay together, is the readmission of, princi- 
pally, the British Pound Sterling to the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism at exchange rates agreed by all as reflect- 
ing fundamentals. There is technically no reason why 
all the currencies concerned should not rejoin the 
E.R.M. On the contrary, if they do not, the Community 
really would be in danger of creating a two speed 
Europe of a kind which is quite incompatible with its 
normal practice or the future intentions in the Maas­
tricht Treaty. Furthermore, without the discipline of 
E.R.M. membership, the convergence programmes 
already agreed, which are indispensable to the credi- 
bility of domestic economic management in most if 
not all the countries concerned, would be fatally 
undermined. There will doubtless be protests from 
certain quarters that a hardening of the inner core, as 
has been suggested, would be humiliating for the 
"weaker countries". No rhetoric can, however, dis- 
guise the fact that there are some stronger economies 
in the European Community and some that are
16
weaker, and it is least of all in the interest of the weak 
that the framework of the E.M.S. should be endanger- 
ed. A decision by the inner group to strenghten their 
relations could therefore be seen as both a measure of 
protection and a further political incentive2.
In the field of the internal security in the Community, 
more and more officials are pleading for a quick 
application of the Treaty of Schengen, which contains 
security measures, if Maastricht is not ratified by all 
member states.
It was on 19th June 1990 that the Agreement for the 
execution of the Accord concluded between the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and the French Republic, concerning the 
Progressive abolition of the control at the common 
borders, was signed. Other member states joined the 
first group later on.
The texts of Maastricht contain indeed non-detailed 
provisions to guarantee the internal security in the 
unified market. It concerns questions in the domain 
of justice and the interior, such as right of asylum, the 
Crossing of external borders, immigration, drugs, 
fraud, and cooperation between police forces, justice 
and customs.
It is not excluded that for external security a current 
of opinion carries the idea through that the approval
EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN 1951 AND IN 1993
2 Ludlow P.W. & D. Gros, The European Union and the Future 
of Europe, CEPS, Brussels, 1992
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of Maastricht is taking too long a time. So Schengen 
could be a much quicker solution. It is said that the 
W.E.U. does not dispose of a military instrument for 
the external security. Since it has been declared that 
the French-German military agreement is not con- 
trary to the W.E.U. or NATO, it is no unthinkable that 
some other member states may join this agreement 
and help to create an instrument for the external 
security of Europe. It has been announced that the 
Netherlands has concluded a convention with Ger- 
many; and Belgium has already sent an observer to 
the French-German headquarters.
Such an evolution, in these three fields, would signify 
that the Europe of the Twelve is not progessing as 
such, but that solutions are been sought in each 
domain separately.
This raises the question how in that case the enlarge- 
ment of the Community must be organised. Will 
certain candidates, if they wish to do so, be allowed 
to enter these new constructions, or do they have to 
wait for better times?
In any case, their entry to the Community, if Maas­
tricht is approved, makes largescale institutional re- 
forms necessary. I evoke some of them: the delicate 
problem of the use of languages, the number of 
members in the European Parliament and of the 
Commission.
But what would happen if Maastricht fails and no 
other solutions are brought about?
18
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Of course, in that case the Commuity remains at the 
existing level of the development based on the ap- 
proved treaties. But it is to be feared, that in such an 
hypothesis, the decision making will almost inevi- 
tably take place more and more at a national level. 
This implies that more conflicts and oppositions will 
arise, of which nobody can predict how solutions can 
be found. Besides, in several member states, new 
tendencies are recommending a return to national 
solutions and the abandonment of Community ones.
With these elements it will be extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to draw up a new improved chapter; 
in fact it will be a going back to obsolete conceptions, 
to inappropriate, or even dangerous positions. I will 
make it clear with an historie comparison: also for this 
return, it concerns an attitude as inefficient as it was 
in the thirties.
We may not forget that a failure of Maastricht, what- 
ever we think of its content, and the impotence to 
accept other, less comprehensive, but still pragmatic 
makeshift contrivances, will have political and psy- 
chological backlashes. This lack of determination 
would be interpreted as the end of the movement 
towards more European unification and even as the 
incapacity of the European Community to solve its 
problems and to develop a vision on the future.
I am convinced that a failure of Maastricht would not 
be limited to this new phase of the European evolu- 
tion. All things considered, Maastricht is the logic, or 
the consequence, of the internal market. Those who
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are in favour of this achievement must accept the 
economic and monetary union, the common foreign 
policy and the internal security measures. If Maas­
tricht is rejected, the internal market will never de- 
liver what we expect from it.
Of course, even if Maastricht comes into being, a 
wrong application of the principle of subsidiarity can 
burden the future. More of more Europeans think that 
if the resentments of many Europeans against a cer- 
tain evolution of the European Community are to be 
met, the European Union needs a constitution. Espe- 
cially in the light of enlargement a systematic reap- 
proval and restatement of the system becomes useful 
if not necessary.
The Treaty of Maastricht envisages a new Inter- 
governmental Conference in 1996. It defines the pur- 
pose of the latter as following: "A conference of 
representatives of the governments of the member 
states shall be convened in 1996 to examine those 
provisions of this Treaty for which revision is pro- 
vided in accordance with the objectives set out in 
articles A and B ".
It has been said that the second intergovernmental 
conference in Maastricht on Political Union suffered 
from the lack of good preparatory work. Such work 
had been carried out for Economic and Monetary 
Union. It was also clear that the members of the 
European Council were not acquainted with ideas 
such as federalism, confederation, intergovernmen- 
talism or the conditions of their success or the reasons
20
of their failure. For the monetary problems they could 
listen to the advice of the Central Bank Governors and 
not suspect experts. For the institutional problems 
they were lost by a lack of knowledge or disputes fed 
by slogans.
To avoid these pitfalls, it is urged that the European 
Council should nominate a committee to draft a con- 
stitution of the Union, which can be taken as the basis 
for negotiation. lts members may not forget that there 
exist already two drafts, drawn up by the European 
Parliament, the first bears the name of the Italian, 
Altiero Spinelli, and the second of the Belgian, Fer- 
nand Herman. The European Parliament decided two 
years ago to prepare a new updated version taking 
into account the recent evolution and the new deci- 
sions from the various Summit meetings. The first 
rapporteur was the Italian, Emilio Colombo. When he 
returned to the Italian Government, his task was 
taken over by the Spaniard, Marcelino Oreja. He 
recently submitted the first drafts to the Institutional 
Committee.
VI
For the famous man in the Street, this does probably 
not look very dramatic. He is rightly concerned with 
the growing unemployment and is probably now and 
then vexed by some detailed aspects of an ambitious 
enterprise. But if our efforts fail, does that mean the 
bankruptcy of a generation and its effort to make 
society a little bit better and hopeful? If this happens 
the greatest political idea of the second half of this
EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN 1951 AND IN 1993
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century would be a shipwrecked, lustreless and ob­
solete.
I have had the pleasure and the honour in my life to 
have known and debated with Jean Monnet. He liked 
to recount that his mother was an intelligent woman 
who was never immediately inspired by great pro- 
posals. She always reacted with the question: "How 
will they be achieved and what shall be the result?". 
The son inherited something from that sceptical self- 
defense. But when that courageous little Frenchman 
with his fantastic character and dynamism was con- 
vinced that something had to be done nobody could 
stop him. Then, he convinced ministers and govern- 
ments, and he produced results.
We must pay tribute to him for his exceptional efforts 
in shaping the European idea. But this work is not 
completed. We were entering the decisive phase. 
Monnet's philosophy was that when facing a crisis 
only two attitudes were possible: either a passive one, 
a kind of resignation, or the decision to develop a new 
action.
If with a clear vision, of which he outlined the main 
characteristics, we try to achieve what has been 
agreed, start a new and hopeful chapter in Europe's 
history, we give a great sense to our own life.
When the Treaty of Rome was approved, my com- 
patriot P.H. Spaak declared that "this time, the men 
from the West have not lacked daring and have not 
taken action too late". Indeed, they created a new and 
successful Community.
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EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN 1951 AND IN 1993
Jacques Delors likes to quote these words with much 
satisfaction and pride because he belongs to the 
leadership of the movement working for the comple- 
tion of the building started in 1951 and continued in 
1957.
But, when he delivered his great speech in February 
1993, describing the coming events, he added some- 
what precariously: "1992 is no longer an objective, it 
is already a reference in Europe, which if we don't 
take care, could become once more the continent of 
all the alarms".
Indeed, the responsibility of our generation is impres- 
sive. Because we must give an answer to the question: 
"what will be made out of Europe?".
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